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Becoming Positive about Being
Carbon Neutral:
Requiring Public Accountability for
Internet Companies
ABSTRACT

Every year, worldwide dependence on Internet and other
information technology services grows. In many ways, the increased use
of electric energy is positive for the environment; after all, using the
Internet to access a document uses less energy than printing and
distributingthat document. Nonetheless, Internet companies expend a
great deal of energy when they, for example, fire up their servers to
satisfy a search request. Studies show that Internet companies are
disproportionately large energy consumers, and are responsible for a
growing number of carbon emissions. As a result, environmentalists
are becoming concerned about the effects of these emissions on climate
change. Despite this concern, Internet companies' carbon emissions are
not only unregulated, they are largely unknown: because the emissions
are indirect-or "Scope 2" they are not included in the EPA's
mandatory reporting requirement for large-scale, direct emissions.
Because Internet companies lack incentive to report their own numbers,
policymakers do not receive accurate data regarding these emissions.
Internet companies also make unverified claims about their
"greenness,"potentially influencing public choice unfairly. In addition
to being potentially unethical, companies claiming that they are "green"
without having to show establishment of more efficient energy
procedures, will not be incentivized to reduce their emissions. This
Note advocates for a federal, mandatory reporting requirement that
encompasses Scope 2 emissions.
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In 2008, a London Times article caused a controversy in the
technological community by suggesting that a typical Google search
emits about seven grams of carbon.'
This estimate implicates all
Internet companies, a term that refers broadly to companies that
make use of information technology and various cloud and Internet

1.
Jonathan Leake & Richard Woods, Google and You'll Damage the Planet, SUNDAY
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at 6.
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services. 2 The estimate has large implications: Despite the fact that
Internet companies consume large amounts of electricity,3 their
carbon emissions escape government regulation because they are
classified as "indirect" rather than "direct."4
Direct, or "Scope 1," emissions result from the activities of an
entity, such as the emissions produced by a coal burning factory or
those of a power company. 5 Indirect, or "Scope 2," emissions are
"emissions that are a consequence of the activities of the reporting
6
entity, but occur at sources owned or controlled by another entity."
For example, a consumer might buy energy from a power company to
heat her house in the winter, which her monthly electric bill will
reflect. The power company from which she buys the energy has
produced Scope 1 emissions by providing that energy, while the
consumer uses, or consumes, the Scope 2 emissions created by the
power company when she turns up her thermostat. Each customer of
that utility company will have a similar electric bill. A public or
private entity attempting to measure the total amount of emissions
used in this transaction can either measure how many total emissions
the power company generates (Scope 1 emissions), or it can measure
the total amount of energy each customer consumed (Scope 2
emissions). In this scenario, mandating the disclosure of only Scope 1
emissions may seem more efficient because it requires one
Ultimately, this
measurement instead of many measurements.
method of measurement will expose a factory that emits a
disproportionately large amount of carbon emissions. However, it will
not expose a single consumer who uses-and thus creates a demand
for-a disproportionately large amount of carbon emissions. Just like
the individual electricity users, Internet companies use substantial

See GARY COOK & JODIE VAN HORN, GREENPEACE INT'L, How DIRTY IS YOUR DATA?:
2.
A LOOK AT THE ENERGY CHOICES THAT POWER CLOUD COMPUTING 7 (Apr. 2011), available at
2
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/Globallinternational/publications/climate/ 011/Cool%20
IT/dirty-data-report-greenpeace.pdf (comparing the green practices of companies, including:
Akamai, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Microsoft, Twitter, and
Yahoo!). Google is frequently referenced, not because it necessarily uses the most energy, but
because it is particularly successful and visible. See infra text accompanying notes 55-59
(discussing the focus on Google).
See COOK & VAN HORN, supra note 2, at 1 ("Data centres to house the explosion of
3.
virtual information currently consume 1.5-2 percent of all global electricity.").
See infra text accompanying notes 5-11.
4.
EPA's Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT.AGENCY, http://www.
5.
epa.gov/greeningepa/ghg (last updated Aug. 16, 2011) (defining Scope 1 emissions); FAQ,
GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, http://www.ghgprotocol.org/calculation-tools/faq (last visited Nov.
1, 2011).
FAQ, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, http://www.ghgprotocol.org/calculation-tools/faq
6.
(last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
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amounts of energy, but indirectly, because they buy the energy that
runs their servers (Scope 2) instead of producing it directly (Scope 1).
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has exercised
its authority to regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, including
carbon, under the Clean Air Act (CAA). 8 In 2009, the EPA finalized a
rule that requires facilities to publicize their direct carbon emissions if
the emissions result from one of thirty source categories, or exceed
25,000 metric tons per year of carbon dioxide equivalent.9 This
information will eventually be included in a publicly accessible carbon
registry, designed to give policymakers a more accurate picture of the
main contributors to climate change.' 0 Internet companies escape this
reporting rule because the EPA did not include large-scale Scope 2
emissions," and Internet companies emit relatively few direct, or
Scope 1 emissions.12
Although the effect known as climate change1 3 continues to be
a divisive issue, a significant portion of the scientific community has
agreed that a buildup of carbon dioxide and other gases is contributing
to unprecedented alterations in the earth's atmosphere. 14 Some
uncertainties remain about the timing, pace, magnitude, and
distributions of its impacts, but the scientific community has largely
agreed that climate change will negatively impact the earth.15
Climate scientists fear that carbon buildup will lead to "potentially
vast environmental and economic damage" in addition to disruption of
the earth's ecosystems, a rise in sea level, and increased drought. 16
A growing body of evidence indicates that Internet companies
are responsible for a disproportionately large amount of carbon
emissions. 7 For this reason, it is likely that Internet companies will
7.
See infra note 71 and accompanying text.
8.
See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006); see also infra notes 67-70 and
accompanying text (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007)).
9.
EPA Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 40 C.F.R. § 98.2(a) (2011).
10.
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.
gov/climatechange/emissions/ghgrulemaking.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2011) ("The purpose of the
rule is to collect accurate and timely GHG data to inform future policy decisions.").
11.
Id. (noting that parties who emit direct source categories are covered by part 98).
12.
See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
13.
See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] Plenary XXVII, Valencia,
Spain, Nov. 12-17, 2007, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (AR4), 36, http://www.ipec.ch/
pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4-syr.pdf [hereinafter IPCC, 2007 Report].
14.
Id. at 36-37.
15.
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY 1137 (6th ed. 2009).
16.

Id. at 1136.

17.
As indirect or Scope 2 users of carbon emissions, the Internet companies do not
create emissions at their source, but instead consume energy created by the power companies.
See supra text accompanying notes 6-8; see also infra Part I.C.3.
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face increasing pressure to reveal their total emissions, particularly by
environmental "watchdogs," such as Greenpeace.' 8 An article in
Environmental Law's Symposium Issue calls electricity generation the
"proverbial elephant in the room" of carbon policy discussions. 19 The
article states that "[i]n 2008, electricity generation alone produced
more greenhouse gas emissions than the entire transportation and
agriculture sectors combined"-roughly 34 percent of all US
emissions. 20
Although Internet companies apparently consume substantial
amounts of electricity, 2 ' it has been difficult for policymakers to
quantify exactly how much energy such companies use. 22 In an
unprecedented move, Google recently publicized its emissions
information on its website, stating that in 2010 it generated a total of
1.46 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, an amount that is roughly
equivalent to the total carbon footprint created by activities
attributable to the United NationS 23 , or slightly higher than those
Meanwhile, other Internet
emitted by the country of Laos. 24
companies state they will not release the numerical value of their total
carbon emissions, citing "competitive reasons."25
In response to public concern about carbon emissions and their
contribution to global warming, 26 Google, Yahoo!, and other Internet
companies have announced voluntary "green policies." 27 Google and

Oliver M. Bayani, Internet Companies Warned of Day of Reckoning in Carbon
18.
Disclosure, ECOSEED (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.ecoseed.org/energy-efficiency-blog/article/17energy-efficiency/11221.
Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving Off the Climate Crisis: The Sectoral Approach Under
19.
the CleanAir Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1148 (2010).
20.
Id. at 1148-49.
21.
See Manek Dubash, Energy Bill for Data Centres Hits the Roof, TECHWORLD (Feb.
15, 2007), http://news.techworld.com/operating-systems/8044/energy-bill-for-data-centres-hitsthe-roof.
COOK & VAN HORN, supra note 2, at 7 (giving letter grades based on an Internet
22.
company's environmental attributes, including a category for transparency or lack thereof).
A recent report states that in 2009, activities attributable to the United Nations
23.
were collectively responsible for 1.7 million tons of greenhouse gases. UN Unveils Report on Size
and Scale of its Carbon Footprint, UN NEWS CENTRE (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewslD=37972.
Tim Albinson, Google Releases its Carbon Footprint Information, 2SUSTAIN (Sept.
24.
12, 2011), http://2sustain.com/2011/09/google-releases-its-carbon-footprint-information.html.
See, e.g., CDP 2011 Investor CDP 2011 Information Request: Yahoo! Inc., CARBON
25.
DISCLOSURE PROJECT, § 10.3, https://www.cdproject.net/Sites/2011/05/20905/Investor%20CDP%
202011/Pages/DisclosureView.aspx [hereinafter Yahoo! Information Request].
Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/
26.
globalwarming/index.html (last updated Sept. 30, 2011).
See, e.g., How GOOD Grows: Climate & Energy, YAHOO!, http://forgood.yahoo.
27.
com/yahoo!-hgg-climate-&-energy.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2011); Our Energy-Saving Data
Centers, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/corporate/green/datacenters (last visited Jan. 24, 2011).
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Yahoo! plan to become "carbon neutral"-a state in which they will
cancel out any negative effects from their own emissions by reducing
the world's carbon by an equivalent amount-through the use of
carbon offsets and clean energy technology. 28 Google emphasizes that
this green policy is completely voluntary; no laws or regulations
require Google to submit its total carbon emissions to any regulatory
body because it does not emit a large amount of direct (Scope 1)
emissions. 29
Non-regulation of indirect emissions from Internet companies
is problematic for several reasons. On a basic level, policymakers
need information to make policy. 30 Currently, they do not have access
to information regarding many Internet companies' respective carbon
footprints. 31 Further, even though Internet companies do not produce
the carbon emissions they consume, as bulk consumers they are in a
better position to control or justify their own emissions than the power
company that produces them. 32 Finally, claiming to be carbon neutral
without verification from a regulatory agency or third party may give
companies an unjustified competitive advantage: Studies show that a
company's green policy influences consumer buying habits. 33

28.
Josie Garthwaite, Google us. Yahoo: The Changing Face of "Carbon Neutral",
GIGAOM (July 9, 2009, 9:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/cleantech/google-vs-yahoo-the-changing-faceof-carbon-neutral [hereinafter Garthwaite, Changing Face]. The term "carbon offsets" refers to
the "credits that cancel out the purchaser's greenhouse gas emissions by supposedly triggering
actions and projects that prevent such pollution elsewhere." Id. When this Note refers to cleaner
energy technology, it is referring to technology that would make the data centers more efficient,
thus using less energy. Id.
29.
CDP 2011 Investor CDP 2011 Information Request: Google Inc., CARBON DISCLOSURE
PROJECT, § 5.1(a), https://www.cdproject.net/Sites/2011/16/7616/Investor%20CDP%202011/
Pages/DisclosureView.aspx [hereinafter Google Information Request]. Google notes in its
responses that it is not now implicated by climate change regulation because "Google has very
few direct emissions." Id.
30.
See Joe Loper & Sara Parr, Energy Efficiency in Data Centers: A New Policy
Frontier, ALLIANCE TO SAVE ENERGY 15-16 (Jan. 2007), available at http://files.harc.edulSites/
accepted
energy
("[W]idely
GulfCoastCHP[Publications/EnergyEfficiencyDataCenters.pdf
performance metrics . . . will provide the groundwork for other policies that will promote the
development and purchase of energy efficient servers including, for example, government
procurement policies and financial incentives.").
31.
See COOK & VAN HORN, supra note 2, at 4.
32.
Internet companies are "bulk consumers" in that they spend tremendous amounts of
money on electricity. See, e.g., Sven Grundberg & Niclas Rolander, For Data Center, Google Goes
for the Cold, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111
904836104576560551005570810.html (noting Google will purchase an amount of electricity
equivalent to 200,000 average American homes). For example, Finnish journalists note that after
the expense of buying a new data center in Finland, Google's single largest cost will be
electricity. Id. This Note thus concludes that even without further regulation, the Internet
companies have a clear incentive to reduce their electricity use.
33.
Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient Corporate
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-BasedDisclosure, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 123 (2009).
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Individual consumers may make environmentally responsible choices
with accurate and complete information. 34
This Note will address the problems of Internet companies'
nondisclosures of their carbon emissions and suggest the best policy
for reducing their indirect emissions. Part I will provide a brief
background of carbon regulation at the federal and state levels, and
will discuss how Internet companies fit into the current regulatory
landscape. Part II will discuss various problems caused by the current
non-regulation, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of various
regulatory options. Part III will propose a solution: A reporting
requirement that will publicize users of large-scale, Scope 2 emissions
in order to (1) incentivize companies to adopt better, more transparent
energy technology and (2) effect change at the individual consumer
level. The conclusion will note how important this information is for
future-potentially more aggressive-carbon regulation.
I. BACKGROUND OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND INTERNET COMPANIES
The debate over the extent and causes of climate change and
the "greenhouse effect" is far from settled, although a large segment of
the scientific community has agreed that human energy consumption
will negatively affect climate change. 35 The greenhouse effect explains
how carbon, emitted as a result of human activity, such as burning
fossil fuels in a factory, expends energy into the earth's atmosphere
and remains there. 36 Although the debate about global warming
continues, state and federal legislators are working to draft
Today, the EPA's
comprehensive climate-change legislation. 37
reporting rule-which requires organizations that directly emit over
25,000 tons of carbon per year or fall into one of thirty source
categories to disclose the exact amount of their emissions-accounts
for large-scale, direct emissions. 38 Internet companies escape this
reporting requirement because, although they consume a significant
amount of carbon, their emissions remain indirect. 39 Furthermore,
many Internet companies decline to self-report total emissions, citing

Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly
34.
Reduce US Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 18452, 18454-55 (2009)
(indicating that consumers made more environmentally-friendly choices when given information
about the environmental impact and price breakdown of their heating practices).
See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
35.
36.
PERCIVAL ET AL., supranote 15, at 1136.
See infra Part II.B.
37.
See EPA Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 40 C.F.R. § 98.2 (2011).
38.
39.
See supra text accompanying notes 5-14.
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"competitive reasons." 40 As a result, neither policymakers nor the
public know much about Internet companies' total carbon footprint. 4 1
A. Global Warming and the "GreenhouseEffect"
The policy debate over the greenhouse effect has shifted in
recent years, with politicians on both sides of the aisle acknowledging
a potential problem.4 2 However, the extent of the damage that could
result from global warming is still debated in scholarly and political
circles. 43
The premise of the greenhouse effect theory is that the
atmospheric accumulation of GHGs has an effect roughly analogous to
that of glass in a greenhouse; the GHGs act as a roof in a greenhouse,
allowing visible light to pass through the atmosphere. 44 The heat is
trapped, and re-transmitted to the earth in the form of infrared rays. 45
The concentration of GHGs in the earth's atmosphere has climbed
dramatically in the past forty years, 46 and there is strong evidence
that this increase is attributable to human behavior, for example,
from the use of energy when people burn fossil fuels.47 In its 2001
Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
stated in its "robust"48 findings, that reduction or mitigation of these
greenhouse gases will "lessen the pressures on natural and human
systems from climate change." 49 Further findings indicate that
without mitigation, climate change will lead to exacerbation in storm
40.
See Yahoo! Information Request, supra note 25.
41.
See infra Part I.C.
42.
See Dana Milbank, Kerry and Gingrich Hugging Trees-and (Almost) Each Other,
WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2007/04/10/
AR2007041001457.html. Milbank quotes former Speaker of the House and current Republican
presidential candidate Newt Gingrich as admitting that global warming is real, that humans
have contributed to it, and that it is something that should be "actively" addressed. Id. at 1.
Democrat John Kerry responded enthusiastically, calling Gingrich's statement "very important."
Id. at 1.
43.
See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Time to Freeze Global Warming, CAN. FREE PRESS (Dec.
17, 2010), http://www.canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/31195.
44.
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15 at 1136 (noting that GHGs include carbon dioxide,
methane, nitrous oxides, and other chemicals).
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
47.
For a more complete summary concerning the causes and expected results of climate
change, see IPCC, Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report (2001) [hereinafter IPCC, 2001
Report], available at http://www.ipec.ch/pdf/climate-changes-2001/synthesis-spm/synthesis-spmen.pdf.
48.
IPCC, 2007 Report, supra note 13, at 72 (defining a robust finding as "one that holds
under a variety of approaches, methods, models and assumptions, and is expected to be relatively
unaffected by uncertainties").
49.
IPCC, 2001 Report, supra note 47, at 32.
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systems, loss in various sensitive ecosystems, and potential increase
in drought.5 0 The IPCC notes that developing countries will bear the
worst of these problems. 5 1
Although there is still disagreement over the extent and causes
of climate change,52 this Note will assume, in accord with a strong
consensus in the scientific community, that the release of carbon
emissions accelerates climate change, thereby damaging the planet.5 3
The theory of supply and demand explains Internet companies'
contributions to the release of GHG. These companies consume large
amounts of power on a routine basis, for example, when using their
servers to run searches for users. 54 In turn, the power companies
directly emit large amounts of greenhouse gases so that they can
produce this power to sell to Internet companies.
Environmental groups and authors of articles on the subject
often single Google out for criticism, largely because it is the most
popular search engine55 and thus the most visible. The authors of the
London Times article that first speculated on Google's carbon footprint
reasoned that because Google is the most popular search engine, 6 it
must conduct the most searches (using dual search engines to produce
famously speedy results) and consequently must consume more
Internet companies are
electricity than other search engines.5 7
secretive about their total emissions, so until Google produced its own
numbers, it was difficult for outside parties to verify the company's
However, the suggestion that Google
actual carbon footprint.5 8
consumes the most electricity simply because it is the most popular
search engine overlooks the fact that even if Google fires up its servers
more often than other Internet companies, it may use less energy if its
servers are more efficient. Further, Google takes many environmental
50.

IPCC, 2007 Report, supra note 13, at 72.

51.

Id. at 65, 72.

Id. at 72-73.
52.
Id. at 72.
53.
See, e.g., Clemmer, supra note 19 (noting how much energy power plants use); see
54.
also Grundberg & Rolander, supra note 32 (noting that Google used the same amount of energy
as 200,000 American Households).
Sara Forden, FTC's Timothy Wu Says Dominant Internet Firms Should Not Add
55.
Monopolies, BLOOMBERG, (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-21/ftc-s-wusays-dominant-Internet-companies-can-t-have-multiple-monopolies.html.
56.
Ross Shannon, Search Engines , HTML SOURCE, http://www.yourhtmlsource.com/
promotion/searchengines.html (last updated Apr. 23, 2010).
See Leake & Woods, supra note 1 (quoting Harvard physicist Alex Wissner-Gross:
57.
"Google operates huge data centres around the world that consume a great deal of power," and
noting that Google search requests are processed by several servers competing against one
another).
58.
See COOK & VAN HORN, supranote 2, at 32 (giving Google an "F' in transparency in
April 2011, before Google released its own numbers in September 2011).
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initiatives that the other companies do not. 59 Subsequently, this Note
often references Google because there is more information available
about Google than any other Internet company; this is not a
suggestion that Google uses energy less efficiently than other Internet
companies.
B. Current GHG Regulation
Today's regulatory landscape contains carbon legislation and
regulations at almost every governmental level. At the federal agency
level, the landmark Supreme Court case Massachusetts v. EPA
recognized that the EPA has the authority to regulate GHG emissions
under the CAA if it finds that GHGs endanger the environment. 60 The
EPA has exercised this authority by requiring companies that emit
large-scale, Scope 1 emissions to report their total emissions.6 1
Additionally, state and federal legislators have worked to create
climate-change legislation. 62 While these efforts have had varying
success at the state level, Congress has not enacted a comprehensive
federal bill directed at climate-change regulation. 63
1. GHG Regulation after Massachusetts v. EPA
The CAA authorizes the EPA to regulate "the emission of any
air pollutant . .. which in [the EPA administrator's] judgment cause,
or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare." 64 An "air pollutant" includes any
"air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any
physical, chemical, biological, radioactive ... substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air."6 5 The
statutory definition for "welfare" is broad, including inter alia, effects

59.
See Tiffany Hsu, Google Invests $55 Million in Mojave Desert Wind Farm, L.A.
TIMES, May 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/may/25/business/la-fi-wind-power-20110
525.
60.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (holding the "EPA has the statutory
authority [under the Clean Air Act] to regulate the emission of such gases from new motor
vehicles").
61.
See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
62.
See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text (discussing current and potential
climate-change legislation at the state and federal levels).
63.
See infra Part I.B.2.
64.
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
65.
Id. § 7602 (g).
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on climate, the physical environment, and the economic welfare of
citizens. 66
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that because
GHGs are pollutants under the CAA, 67 the EPA was compelled to
determine whether GHGs endangered public health or welfare. 68 The
agency concluded "that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere endanger
both the public health and the environment for current and future
generations," and that the "combined emissions" of new source
vehicles contribute to the buildup of GHGs in the climate, therefore
Thus, as air pollutants that
adding to the climate problem. 6 9
endanger public health or welfare, GHGs now meet the statutory
requirements of the CAA, and the EPA has the statutory authority to
regulate GHG emissions. 70
2. Current and Potential Federal Regulations for Stationary Sources:
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program
The EPA currently requires disclosure of only large scale,
direct (Scope 1) emissions under its Greenhouse Gas Reporting
program.7 1 This program requires "[s]uppliers of fossil fuels or
industrial GHGs, manufacturers or [sic] vehicles and engines, and
facilities that emit 25,000 metric tons or more per year of GHG"
emissions, to submit annual reports to the EPA. 72 The EPA cites the
CAA as the authority behind the reporting regulation. 73 After
Massachusetts v. EPA,74 the agency announced in a proposed rule that

66.
Id. § 7602(h) ("[E]ffects on welfare includes . . . effects on soils, waters, crops,
vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to
and deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic
values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether caused by transformation, conversion, or
combination with other air pollutants.").
67.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
Id. at 534; see also Nathan Richardson et al., Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the
68.
Clean Air Act: Structure, Effects, and Implications of a Knowable Pathway, 41 ENVTL L. REP.
10098, 10100 (2011).
69.
EPA's Endangerment Finding, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/endangerment/downloads/EndangermentFindingLegalBasis.pdf.
70.
Id.
See EPA Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting, 40 C.F.R. § 98.1(a) (2011).
71.
72.
Mandatory Green House Gas (GHG) Reporting Rule Requirements, ASSOCIATES
ENVTL., 1 http://www.associatesenvironmental.com/Greenhouse-GasEPA-web.pdf (last visited
Nov. 1, 2011).
73.
40 C.F.R. § 98.1 (citing as authority the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671
(2006)).
74.
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
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the CAA provided it broad authority to implement the reporting
requirement.7 5
The information that companies submit is "potentially subject
to public availability." 76 However, in response to complaints, the EPA
is now considering whether publicizing the emissions in the notice and
comment period will harm business interests.7 7 In its interim final
rule, the EPA acknowledged that the CAA dictates that emissions
data are not to be afforded formal, confidential protections, but,
ultimately cited the need for further review. 7 8 Although the deadline
for reporting was originally March 2011, the EPA has since pushed it
back to March 2013, and 2015, for certain companies.79
Beyond the reporting requirement, it appears that the EPA
could enact further, more aggressive climate-change legislation;
however, further regulation under the authority of the CAA may be
less than ideal.80 For example, pursuant to the CAA, the EPA already
has programs in place to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) for each of its "criteria" pollutants.8 1 These standards are
both technology-based and effects-based: Under the NAAQS program,
the EPA can dictate a minimum quality for technology use in affected
areas as well as a maximum amount of pollutant allowed in a
geographical area. 82 Regulating GHGs solely through the CAA can be
problematic,
however,
because
of
the
unique,
physical
boundary-crossing aspect of GHG emissions: Global warming is a
global issue caused by "GHG emissions without regard for where they
originate."83 Further climate-change legislation should address these
trans-boundary issues and the CAA may be too rigid to do so. 8 4

75.
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases: Injection and Geologic Sequestration of
Carbon Dioxide, 75 Fed Reg. 18,576, 18,580 (Apr. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98)
(providing that the CAA allows the Administrator to "require emissions sources, persons subject
to the CAA, or persons whom the Administrator believes may have necessary information to
monitor and report emissions and provide such other information as the Administrator requests
for the purposes of carrying out the provisions in the CAA").
76.
Confidential Business Information, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
climatechange/emissions/CBI.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).
77.
Id.
78.
Interim Final Regulation Deferring the Reporting Date for Certain Data Elements
Required Under the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 81,338,
81,339 (Dec. 27, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98).
79.
See ConfidentialBusiness Information,supra note 76.
80.
See infra note 83.
81.
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 500.
82.
For a more complete discussion of the Clean Air Act, see id. at 698.
83.
Id. at 516. ("Many people believe that the existing Clean Air Act is ill-suited for
regulation of GHG emissions . . . [because] the problem of climate change is global.").
84.
Id.
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At the federal level, the Obamia administration has expressed
interest in a bill that will set a ceiling for US GHG emissions; a goal
he may attempt to meet with a cap-and-trade scheme. 85 This type of
legislation would set a limit on the amount of emissions a company
can exude, but would also allow a company that wants to emit above
the limit to trade for the right to do so with a company that emits
below the limit.8 6 In this way, the total amount of emissions in the
environment stays constant, and companies that have larger or
smaller emissions can find a workable limit.87 Congress has proposed
and rejected various cap-and-trade bills; the Waxman-Markey Bill, a
high profile climate-change bill, passed in the House but expired
before the Senate voted on it.88 While other environmental activists
have suggested other schemes, such as a carbon tax,8 9 there is no
national legislation designed to control Internet companies' GHG
emissions.
3. State and Private Regulations Managing GHG Emissions
Members of the Climate Registry, a nonprofit organization that
operates a voluntary carbon disclosure registry in North America,
have described the relationship between state regulations and the new
Some states, including
EPA requirements as a "patchwork."90
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, have stepped in
where the federal government has not, establishing mandatory carbon
reporting requirements such as those imposed under the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative Program. 9 1 However, like the EPA's
Mark Peters, White House Seeks Bill on Climate by December, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
85.
2009, at A3.
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 604.
86.
Id. at 603-04. JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
87.
R40242, CARBON TAX AND GREENHOUSE GAS CONTROL: OPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
CONGRESS (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/miscR40242.pdf (discussing policy
choices and tools available for addressing greenhouse gas emissions).
John M. Broder, 'Cap and Trade' Loses its Standing as Energy Policy of Choice, N.Y.
88.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/science/earthl26climate.html. For
some, the defeat of the Waxman-Markey Bill, American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009), was damaging to the cause of cap-and-trade in general. See id.
See RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 87 (discussing policy choices and tools available
89.
for addressing greenhouse gas emissions).
90.
Denise Sheehan & Alex Carr, The Future of GHG Reporting: Patchwork or
Tapestry?, CLIMATE REGISTRY, 12 (Oct. 2010), http://www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/
2010/10/sheehan.pdf.
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire are all members of the Regional
91.
Greenhouse Gas Initiative's mandatory cap-and-trade program. RGGI, Inc., REGIONAL
GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://rggi.org/rggi (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). These states have
3
enacted their own reporting regimes, see CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 22a-174- 1 (2011); 310 MASS.
CODE REGS. § 7.71 (2010); N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. ENV-A 900-12 (2010), and are all members
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reporting program, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative only
requires the reporting of Scope 1 emissions. 92
Private reporting regimes such as the Carbon Disclosure
Project (CDP)9 3 publish both Scope 1 and 2 emissions; 94 however, these
may
not be
therefore
and
requirements
voluntary
are
For example, Yahoo! responded to the CDP's
comprehensive.9 5
questionnaires, but removed the total emissions used by their data
centers to avoid revealing trade secrets, possibly concerned that a
from their
information
could gain competitive
competitor
infrastructure. 96 Microsoft has not submitted answers to the detailed
CDP.
C. How Much Carbon the Internet Companies Use: An Estimate
In addition to the authors of the London Times article who
speculated on Google's carbon footprint, the EPA has also had
difficulty determining the Internet companies' carbon footprints.97 In
April 2011, Greenpeace, a nonprofit organization that works, inter
alia, to create a global solution that will protect the environment,
released a report giving several Internet companies a letter grade in
various categories, including "transparency."98 Before announcing its
numbers in September 2011, Google received an "F."99 Internet
of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative's mandatory cap-and-trade program. RGGI, Inc.,
supra.
92.
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Mark A. Cohen, Climate Change Governance:
Boundaries and Leakage, 18 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 250 (2010).
93.
The Carbon Disclosure Project is a nonprofit organization that operates a carbon
reporting registry. Overview, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdproject.net/enUS/WhatWeDo/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 16, 2011). Participants include both
national and international organizations. Id. CDP receives funding from various foundations as
well as several governments, including those of the UK, the US, Sweden, France, Holland and
Australia, as well as from corporate sponsorships, CDP member packages, and global
partnerships. Id.
94.
The Carbon Disclosure Project accepts, publishes, and factors data for a company's
Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions into its score report. Quick Facts, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT,
(last visited
https://www.cdproject.net/CDPResults/67_329_168_CDP6%2OQuick%2OFacts.pdf
December 9, 2011).
95.
See Will Nichols, Government Urged Again to Deliver Mandatory Emissions
Reporting, Bus. GREEN (July 5, 2011), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/2084015/
government-urgered-deliver-mandatory-emissions-reporting (discussing carbon reporting in the
United Kingdom).
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
96.
97.
EPA, ENERGY STAR PROGRAM, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SERVER AND DATA
CENTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY: PUBLIC LAW 109-431 7(Aug. 2, 2007) [hereinafter ENERGY STAR,

REPORT TO CONGRESS], available at http://www.energystar.gov/ialpartners/prod-development/
downloads/EPADatacenterReport CongressFinall.pdf
98.
COOK & VAN HORN, supra note 2.
Id.
99.
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companies cite "competitive reasons" for failing to disclose their total
carbon emissions, without elaborating further on how their trade
secrets would be compromised by disclosure. 100 Many Internet
companies have posted voluntary "green" policies, in which they claim
either to have greatly reduced their carbon footprint or to be carbon
neutral. 101

1. The Numbers from the London Times Article
The 2009 London Times article suggesting that each Google
search uses about seven grams of carbon did not stand up well to
criticism: the authors backtracked from their original statement, and
acknowledged that external factors would alter the results they
reached.102 Some of the most damning criticism came from Harvard
physicist Alexander Wisse-Grosse, who wrote the study on which the
London Times authors relied to write their article. 103 Wisse-Grosse
cast doubt on many of the authors' assertions, specifically that he ever
singled out Google. 10 4 Google responded by declaring that each search
only expends 0.2 grams of carbon instead of the 7 grams originally
cited.105 Google published its own accounting of its carbon footprint
two years after the London Times article was published, suggesting
that "the energy used to complete 100 searches is equivalent to using
a 30 W laptop for an hour or burning a 60 W light bulb for 28
minutes." 106

Yahoo! Information Request, supra note 25.
100.
See Josie Garthwaite, Google vs. Yahoo: Two Routes Toward Carbon Neutral,
101.
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 9, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/
jul2009/tc2009079_137943.htm.
102.
Leake & Woods, supranote 1.
Id.
103.
104.
See Renay San Miguel, Harvard Physicist Sets Record Straight on Internet Carbon
Study, TECHNEWS WORLD (Jan. 12, 2009, 2:42 PM), http://www.technewsworld.com/rsstory/
65794.html.
105.
Ben Dowell, Sunday Times Clarifies Figures in Google Carbon Emissions Debate,
THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 16, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/jan/16/carbon-sundaytimes-google-clarification.
Albinson, supra note 24.
106.
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2. Resistance to Disclosure
Some Internet companies, including Yahoo!, refuse to disclose
their carbon emissions because they say this will reveal sensitive
However, they have not
information to their competitors.10 7
elaborated on how this information will aid competitors.1 08 In its
online "green policy," Microsoft states its commitment to reducing or
eliminating its carbon footprint, but does not specify its carbon
footprint numbers. 109 While environmentalists have praised Google
for disclosing its carbon footprint, some have noted that without
access to past years' total emissions as a basis of comparison, there is
no way to know whether Google's numerous green initiatives are
effective.11o Further, Google has only released its total emissions.1 11
Without additional details, such as the number of servers Google uses,
how efficient its equipment is, and the server size, it is still unclear
whether it is possible for a third party to check Google's calculations
for accuracy. 112
Further, the data industry is having difficulty providing a truly
meaningful comparison between Internet companies, even as each
claims to be "green" or the "greenest." 13 Data companies currently
use a categorical listing of their Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE),
which industry commentators have called "a great step." 114 PUE is a
measure of how efficiently a computer data center uses its power or
more specifically, how much of the power is used by the computing
equipment (in contrast to cooling and other overhead). 115 The ideal
PUE is 1.0; that number can serve as a baseline to help make

107.
Cf. Yahoo! InformationRequest, supra note 25.
108.
See Chris Mellor, Google's Green Credentials Confirmed: An Interview with Google's
Director of Energy Strategy, TECHWORLD (June 27, 2007), http://features.techworld.com/greenit/3494/googles-green-credentials-confirmed (noting that, although Google is partnering with an
independent third party to determine its accurate carbon footprint, information will not be
revealed because it comprises "key competitive elements of [its] operational infrastructure").
109.
See The Carbon Trust Standard, MIcROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/uk/
environment/reducing-our-carbon-footprint.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
110.
Raz Godelnik, Google Releases Details on its Carbon Footprint, TRIPLE PUNDIT
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.triplepundit.com/2011/09/google-finally-released-details-carbonfootprint-reducing.
111.
See id.
112.
See infra text accompanying notes 113-122.
113.
See The Carbon Trust Standard,supra note 109 ("In the face of so much talk around
'green' we've been focused on quietly getting on with actually being green.").
114.
Rich Miller, Green Grid: PUE Uptake a 'Great First Step', DATA CENTER
KNOWLEDGE (Dec. 17, 2008), http:www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2008/12/17/greengrid-pue-uptake-a-great-first-step.
115.
Id.
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comparisons among companies. 16 For example, Google is explicit
about the data included in the PUE.'1 7 Google's current PUE ranges
Theoretically, another company
between a 1.14 and 1.11.118
computing the same way could provide an effective comparison in
terms of relative efficiency.' 1 9
However, there are clear limitations to a PUE-based analysis.
Some commentators challenge the assumption that the PUE
accurately measures the efficiency of data equipment at all.120
Additionally, some companies only publish their final PUE without
publishing the individual numbers they used to arrive at their total,
for example, how many servers they use. 121 This may be indicative of
how efficient the equipment is, but does not reveal how much carbon a
search produces. Therefore, even with the PUE, it will still be difficult
for policymakers to make an aggregate analysis of Internet companies'
total carbon footprint. The Google example illustrates this problem:
The company uses multiple competing servers to produce an answer to
one search query, so it may have more efficient equipment but still
produce twice as many carbon emissions. 122 Ultimately, the PUE is a
difficult substitute for publicly available calculations because a third
party cannot check these numbers-nor is there an accessible public
format that explains Internet search engine usage and resultant
carbon emissions.

116.
See id.; see also Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE), DIGITAL REALTY TR.,
http://www.digitalrealtytrust.com/pue-efficiency.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
Data Center Efficiency, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/
117.
efficiency/power-usage.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2011) (noting that their calculation of PUE is
limited to "the servers, storage and networking equipment when measuring IT equipment
power").
Id.
118.
119.
See Miller, supra note 114.
120.
Indus. Perspectives, The PUE is Dead: The Case for Performance Per Watt, DATA
CENTER KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/2011/11/15/
pue-is-dead-the-case-for-performance-per-watt (arguing that the PUE only "measures how much
of the energy entering a data center facility is used to power the computing devices within,
versus the amount used for cooling and overhead of the facility" instead of the overall efficiency
of the data center equipment).
121.
See Miller, supra note 114 (noting that some questioned Google's PUE math while
others believed long-term PUE numbers would be more helpful than "one time 'snapshots').
See Leake & Woods, supra note 1 (noting that a Google user's search request does
122.
not go to just one server, but goes to several competing servers).

442

VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:2:425

3. Koomey Study and EPA Findings
Professor Jon Koomey, a notable academic in the field of
electrical energy, provides some relevant information regarding the
vast amount of electricity that data centers are using. 123 He notes
that because the number of servers in the United States and around
the world has increased, aggregate electricity use doubled from 2000
to 2005.124 He estimates that servers comprised 0.6 percent of total
US electricity consumption in 2005.125 With cooling and auxiliary
infrastructure equipment, that number increases to 1.2 percent. 126
Professor Koomey has recently said that he does not expect rates to
continue to rise at the same pace. 127
In its 2007 report to Congress analyzing data server efficiency,
the EPA concluded that in the previous year, both public and privately
operated US data centers' energy use was equivalent to the amount of
energy that 5.8 million US households used during the same period. 128
The EPA noted that its findings were based on "the best publicly
available data" because it experienced some difficulty in finding
readily apparent data on the servers; without further legislation, or
potential EPA action, the EPA only has access to the same data as the

123.

JONATHAN G. KOOMEY, ESTIMATING TOTAL POWER CONSUMPTION BY SERVERS IN THE

U.S. AND THE WORLD i (Feb. 15, 2007), available at http://blogs.business2.com/greenwombat/files/
serverpowerusecomplete-v3.pdf.
124.

Id.

125.

Id.

126.
Id. For more information on why 1.2 percent-a relatively small percentage-is
large enough to be worth regulating, see Kevin Stack & Michael Vandenbergh, The One Percent
Problem, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1385 (2011). The authors note that the "one percent problem" arises
where multiple parties "commonly justify exemption from regulation by claiming to be only one
percent of a problem." Id. at 1386. This exemption becomes a problem in the context of climate
change, where many parties are small-scale contributors. Id. at 1388. Professors Stack and
Vandenbergh further argue that it is easy for industry to make these arguments in the context of
climate change, and "[i]t is nearly impossible to reach established emissions reduction goals
without addressing the vast number of sources, sectors, and countries that can frame their
emissions as just one percent, or far below one percent, of the problem." Id. at 1443. This Note
operates on the assumption that ignoring the many, relatively small contributors-that in the
aggregate have a large impact on climate change-will ultimately impede progress toward the
goal of reducing carbon emissions.
127.
Matt Stansberry, Jon Koomey: Stopping the Runaway Train of Server Energy Usage,
SEARCHDATACENTER (Aug. 12, 2010), http://searchdatacenter.techtarget.com/news/1518354/JonKoomey-Stopping-the-runaway-train-of-server-energy-usage. In an interview, Professor Koomey
has suggested that he is just after information. Id. The purpose of this Note is not to criticize
electronic server data, but to show that emissions disclosure should be required because it will
prevent false advertising and promote efficiency. See id. Ultimately, as Professor Koomey says, it
is still a more efficient use of energy to push around electronic molecules instead of paper
molecules; the issue here is that the public does not know how much energy is being consumed
by these Internet giants, and the numbers appear to be staggeringly high. Id.
128.
ENERGY STAR, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 97, at 25.
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public.129 The report included recommendations mandating more
publicly available information to provide a better basis of comparison
among various data servers.130
4. The Internet Companies' Approach to Energy Management
Although Internet companies' carbon emissions are not
regulated under federal or state law, most large Internet companies
have adopted their own "green" policies.131 These companies are likely
adopting cleaner energy policies voluntarily for several reasons: social
responsibility, public perception as it relates to consumer choice, the
cost of electricity, and the anticipation of stricter energy
regulations.132 Because there is a wide range of potential approaches
to regulation, some companies are taking a proactive approach. 133
These companies have devised a system to measure their own
carbon efficiency, claiming that third parties check their
calculations.13 4 Although many companies have not revealed their
totals, they must know their own total emissions if they can comment
on their emissions reductions or the relative efficiency of their
equipment. 135 Today, many Internet companies decline to participate
in voluntary cap-and-trade programs. 3 6 Internet companies do not
participate in some of these voluntary reduction programs because
without mandatory disclosure, they face little public accountability for
their emissions.137 Without a more transparent system that can
engender genuine comparison between the companies' total emissions,
it will (1) be difficult for the public to give credit, reflected in consumer
See id.
129.
Id. at 14.
130.
See, e.g., Our Footprint, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/environment/our131.
commitment/our-footprint.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (stating Microsoft's goal for 2012 is to
reduce carbon emissions per unit of revenue by at least 30 percent as compared with their 2003
levels by using, inter alia, more efficient equipment); Reducing Our Carbon Footprint, GOOGLE
BLOG (May 6, 2009, 3:05 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/05/reducing-our-carbonfootprint.html (noting that Google has been voluntarily carbon neutral since 2007, and remains
committed to reducing its footprint through offsets and greater efficiency).
132.
See Aseem Prakash, Green Marketing, Public Policy and ManagerialStrategies, 11
BUs. STRATEGY & ENV'T 285, 286-90 (2002), available at http://www.greeneconomics.net/
GreenMarketing.pdf.
See, e.g., Google Information Request, supra note 29, § 5.1(a). Here, Google states
133.
that it does not expect to participate in compliance-market trading. Id. However, it notes that
"Google does ... face the risk of increased cost of energy if a price on carbon is applied through
legislation such as cap and trade (or other mechanisms such as taxation)." Id.
See Reducing Our Carbon Footprint,supra note 131.
134.
See Yahoo! Information Request, supranote 25.
135.
See id. Yahoo! and Google currently decline to participate in voluntary cap136.
and-trade schemes. See id.; Google Information Request, supranote 29.
137.
See infra Part II.A.1.
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behavior, for true technological innovations that reduce emissions, 138
and (2) for policymakers to understand the scope of Internet
companies' contributions to climate change. 139
Various legislative options have several notable flaws.
Currently, the EPA has not attempted to create a mandatory, publicly
accountable registry that would encompass private, indirect
emissions. 140 Further, under the CAA, the EPA is having trouble
publicizing direct emissions in response to pressures from companies
who do not want to submit their information. 141 State and local
schemes suffer from a lack of uniformityl 42 and large, national
companies can easily manipulate these schemes. 143
For these reasons, this Note will argue that the US Congress is
best positioned to enact legislation mandating the publication of
accurate and uniform secondary emissions, giving direct authority to
the EPA to enact this scheme. This legislation will incentivize
Internet companies to present accurate information regarding their
relative carbon emissions and to compete to create and utilize the
most energy efficient technology.
II. LEGISLATIVE OPTIONS FOR INTERNET COMPANIES IN THE CURRENT
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE

Internet companies' lack of transparency regarding total
emissions prevents policymakers from learning how much energy
Internet companies are indirectly utilizing and prevents the public
from making meaningful comparisons to determine which company is
the most energy-efficient. 144
This presents a problem for several reasons. First, without a
public registry of comparative energy efficiency, companies will have
little incentive to become more energy efficient. Yet the current lack
of transparency allows these companies to announce that they are
"carbon neutral" 145 or use the "most efficient equipment" by using
unclear methods 146 without verification. This could have unfair effects
on consumer choice, specifically for those who wish to purchase the

138.
See infra Part II.A.2.
139.
See infra Part III.B.
140.
See supra Part I.B.2.
141.
See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
142.
See Sheehan & Carr, supranote 90.
143.
See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
144.
See ENERGY STAR, REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 97.
145.
Jeffrey Ball, Green Goal of 'Carbon Neutrality' Hits Limit, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30,
2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123059880241541259.htm.
146.
See infra part II.A.
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most environmentally efficient product on the market.14 7 Second,
environmentally conscious consumers who modify their personal
habits when they have access to accurate energy use information, may
also modify their habits when given similar information regarding
Internet search. 148 Third, policymakers need to know how much
energy these companies use, so that they can craft the most effective
and fair climate-change regulation. 149
An effective option for Internet companies is a publicly
accountable, national carbon registry that includes Scope 2
emissions. 50 Any strong regulatory solution will consider the two
main factors that dictate emission control policy: (1) the costs and (2)
whether regulation will be effective. 151
Some of the current or suggested approaches are unfeasible,
either because they are impractical or because they do not account for
the above mentioned factors. For example, although it should expect
opposition from Internet companies given the controversy over
reporting requirements for companies that directly emit more than
25,000 grams of carbon, the EPA has authority under the CAA to
mandate disclosure. 152 Therefore, it is likely that this approach would
be similarly cumbersome. State legislation is another possible vehicle
to address this issue. Although this has been somewhat effective at
the local level, it does not create a comprehensive national climatechange policy because each state takes its own approach. 15 3 Thus, this
method would be ineffective for large corporations, like Google, that
have servers in several states and can concentrate their operations in
a state with more lax requirements. 15 4 Finally, federal lawmakers
147.
See infra Part II.A.2.
See Dietz et al., supra note 34, at 18455 (noting that lifestyle changes, especially
148.
those enacted in conduction with a cost incentive, may become attractive options for dealing with
climate change).
See Loper & Parr, supra note 30, at 15-16.
149.
Scope 3 emissions are also effective and should be included. However, that is beyond
150.
the scope of this Note.
RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 87, at 17-19 (noting that while cap-and-trade may
151.
be a more effective solution, a carbon tax is less expensive to implement).
Compare Dina Cappiello, Largest US Polluters Want EPA to Keep Their Emissions
152.
Secret From Public, COMMON DREAMS (OCT. 28, 2010), http://www.commondreams.org/headline/
2010/10/28-3 (discussing resistance to the EPA reporting rule by affected companies who do not
want to disclose emissions), with EPA Announces New GHG Reporting Deadline, ENVTL. LEADER
2011), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2011/03/17/epa-announces-new-ghg17,
(Mar.
reporting-deadline (noting that EPA's reporting deadline has been pushed back).
153.
Sheehan & Carr, supra note 90.
See, e.g., COOK & VAN HORN, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that data center clusters, like
154.
those owned by Google, Facebook, and Apple, are cropping up in places like North Carolina and
the Midwest, where cheap and dirty coal-powered electricity is abundant); John Markoff & Saul
Hansell, Hiding in Plain Sight, Google Seeks More Power, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/06/14/technology/14search.html (noting that in 2006, Yahoo!, Microsoft,
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typically consider cap-and-trade, and to a lesser extent, a carbon tax,
5
Although cap-and-trade
when crafting energy regulation proposals.'1
may be effective in regulating carbon emissions, it is more expensive
than a carbon registry, and has had trouble passing in Congress. A
carbon registry will not set a cap for total emissions the way a
cap-and-trade scheme will, however, it will force Internet companies
to be accountable to the public for their emissions. If necessary,
lawmakers can use the information from the Registry as a means to
enact more aggressive regulation. For these reasons, the Federal
Carbon Registry is the strongest solution to the problem posed by
Internet companies.
A. Problems Caused by Leaving Internet Companies Unregulated
Without regulation, Internet companies have no incentive to
invest in cleaner energy. Compared to an outside organization,
Internet companies are in the best position to create and dictate
cleaner energy technology because they have to pay for the carbon
they use and have unique insight into their own infrastructure and
carbon needs.
However, without mandated reporting, Internet
companies will remain opaque regarding their carbon consumption
while continuing to claim carbon efficiency or neutrality.156 This
leaves both policymakers and the public without the information they
need to make informed choices.
It also raises ethical concerns,
especially in light of studies showing that these claims have a
measureable effect on consumer choice. 15 7
1. Internet Companies are in the Best Position to Invest in Cleaner
Energy, and without Regulation they Lack Incentive to Create
Cleaner Energy
Failure to regulate Internet companies reduces the companies'
incentives
to
create
better,
energy-efficient
technology.
Technology-based standards for regulated industries are common in
environmental regulatory regimes.15 8
Internet companies can
and Google were building servers in Washington and Oregon, where "cheap electricity" is readily
available).
155.
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 158.
156.
See Ball, supra note 145.
See infra Part II.A.2.
157.
158.
See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1316-17 (2006) (establishing multiple
technology-based effluent limitations); see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 638. A typical
technology-based standard is usually employed to control pollution at its source, i.e., where
pollution is introduced to surface waters, air, or drinking waters. Wendy E. Wagner, The
Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 88-89. Generally enacted by

2012]

ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CARBON EMISSIONS

447

voluntarily use these standards to help create an effective comparison
of their relative energy efficiency.
Technology-based standards create a uniform set of
expectations for companies that are cost-effective and reasonable. 159
The Clean Water Act is considered a relatively successful example of a
technology-based standard because affected waters have been found
less polluted since its enactment widely because of its provisions. 160
Global policymakers argue that climate-control policy should
encourage the electric industry to develop better technology-based
standards to help control carbon emissions.1 6'
The rationale for creating a system in which unofficial,
industry-wide, and technology-based limits result is that these
regulations will incentivize the regulated parties to compete and
create efficient energy technology. 162 The government could use a
cost-effective PUE to serve as this standard, enabling it to measure
the carbon footprints of similarly situated Internet companies.
However, this kind of standard could face enormous resistance from
affected industries, and without more information it might unfairly
disadvantage smaller companies that cannot cut energy costs the
same way the larger corporations can. But a public reporting
requirement could have the same effect on the industry by forcing
Internet companies to self-regulate based on the unofficial norm it
would create: They would face internal-and even external-pressure
from consumers to catch up with the rest of the industry. The smaller
companies would be protected, and the larger companies would not be
negatively incentivized to remain at the government standard.
Further, it is logical to assume that Internet companies are
easier to incentivize than direct emitters such as power companies
because the power companies make money from the sale of electricity
whereas Internet companies have to pay for power. 163 Because power
the EPA, the Agency will begin by researching available and potential technologies that can
control pollution in a given industry. Id. The EPA will ultimately choose a standard type of
technology based on the technology available and the cost-considerations of implementing that
technology. Id.
159.
Wagner, supra note 158.
William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Air Act Been a Success?,
160.
55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 592 (2004) ("Together with the funding of thousands of municipal
wastewater treatment facilities, the technology-based approach has produced remarkable
reductions in both municipal and industrial [water] pollution.").
Ziga Zarnic, European Electricity Market Reforms: Any Signs of Efficiency
161.
Improvements? 4 (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, LICOS Discussion Paper Series, Discussion
Paper 262/2010, May 2010), http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/licos/DP/DP2010/DP262.pdf.
Id.
162.
According to Bill Weihl, head of Google's sustainability efforts, despite Google's
163.
substantial energy bill, it does not represent a large portion of Google's overall costs. However,
Weihl notes, reduced energy use is good for both the environment and Google's bottom line. Steve
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companies make money when Internet companies purchase energy,
they will have an incentive to meet the minimum threshold that a
However, Internet
technology-forcing standard would create.
companies will gain financially from more efficient energy use because
their energy bills will be lower.164 Creating new, energy-efficient
technology could be expensive, which could discourage initial
innovation. 165 However, a cleaner energy policy will reduce larger
Internet companies' electricity bills.1 66
2. Ethical Concerns When Internet Companies Claim Carbon
Neutrality Where there is No Third Party to Check these Calculations
Lack of transparency raises ethical concerns when Internet
companies claim to be carbon neutral without outside third-party
verification. In light of SEC guidance suggesting that companies
should accurately disclose their risk in the face of climate-change
legislation, an inaccurate claim of carbon neutrality is unethical.167 It
is also unfair because: (1) without public accountability, there is no
way to verify these companies' claims of carbon neutrality, and (2)
these companies' green policies will directly affect consumer choice. 168
The public cannot verify anything about Internet companies'
relative carbon neutrality because there is no way to compare the
numbers effectively. The standard industry measurement, PUE,
creates a baseline but lacks consistency in how each company defines
its total energy output. 169 Further, the relative efficiency of each
company's output only tells half of the story because it says nothing

Hargreaves, The Internet: One Big Power Such, CNN MONEY (May 9, 2011) (discussing internet
companies' large electricity usage and bills).
164.
Id.
It is fairly common for an affected industry to argue that implementing stricter
165.
environmental standards will be prohibitively expensive. See Editorial, Detroit Turns a Corner,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1998, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/01/11/opinion/detroitturns-a-corner.html ( "There has always been a big gap between industrial leaders who say they
cannot do something, and their engineers who usually figure out a way to do it.").
166.
See id.; see also discussion supra Part I.C.2 (arguing that without greater
transparency, the Internet companies are not publicly accountable because the public cannot
effectively compare the relative efficiency of the companies without an accurate total number of
emissions).
167.
An inaccurate statement of carbon neutrality would be unethical in light of guidance
from the Security and Exchange Commission suggesting that companies should disclose their
climate change risks, See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
168.
Siebecker, supra note 33, at 123-24; see also Joe Polastre, Top 5 Myths About Google
Data, ZDNET (Apr. 26, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.zdnet.comlnews/top-5-myths-about-googledata-centers/417847 (suggesting that the selective information some Internet companies choose
to disclose to the public can be misleading).
169.
See supra notes 113-122 and accompanying text.
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about the overall size of the company's carbon footprint. 170
Policymakers need to know the total amount of emissions to determine
whether they need to take more aggressive action. According to a
study by Professor Koomey, diversity among server types makes
comparison difficult for industry outsiders.171 Finally, because it is
unknown how many servers larger Internet companies have, 172 and
the PUE only calculates the relative efficiency of the technology, the
PUE will not help calculate the total amount of the companies' power
outputs: Ten efficient servers may still create more emissions than one
inefficient server. 173 Although recent articles suggest that Google and
Microsoft may be moving ahead in the PUE rankings, 174 these
combined factors make a meaningful comparison difficult.
Internet companies have used two main schemes to reduce
their carbon footprints: (1) creating more efficient machines, and (2)
utilizing carbon offsets. 175 Companies who bolster their claims to be
"voluntarily" carbon neutral through the use of carbon offsets are
problematic because of the controversy surrounding this method of
carbon reduction.' 76 The idea behind carbon offsets is that a company
that cannot otherwise reduce its carbon use, purchases carbon
"credits"-for example, from an organization working to reduce carbon
emissions-which help fund projects that reduce carbon expenditures
in an amount that equals the company's extra expenditure. 77
However, the carbon market is largely unregulated, and in the past
few years, studies have suggested that some carbon offsets may not
offset the corresponding carbon expenditures. 7 8
Sometimes,
companies will buy carbon credits for projects that are never
completed, or projects that would have been completed without the

170.
See Miller, supranote 114.
See KOOMEY, supra note 123.
171.
172.
Rich Miller, Who Has the Most Web Servers?, DATA CENTER KNOWLEDGE (May 14,
2009), http://www.datacenterknowledge.comlarchives/2009/05/14/whos-got-the-most-web-servers
(estimating how many servers Google, Yahoo!, and Microsoft have).
173.
See supranotes 113-122 and accompanying text.
174.
Cf. Jaymi Heimbuch, Microsoft to Google: My PUE is Getting Better Than Your
PUE, TREEHUGGER (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.treehugger.com/clean-technology/microsoft-togoogle-my-pue-is-getting-better-than-your-pue.html.
175.
See, e.g., Garthwaite, supra note 101 (detailing the two approaches Google and
Yahoo! have taken to improve their overall carbon footprint: carbon offsets (Google) and more
efficient technology (Yahoo!)); sources cited supra note 131.
176.
See Garthwaite, supra note 101.
177.
Craig Rubens, The House Duped by Carbon Offsets?, GIGAOM (Jan. 29, 2008, 5:00
(detailing some of the
AM), http://gigaom.com/cleantech/the-house-duped-by-carbon-offsets
problems in the carbon offset market, including where additional carbon reduction is thwarted
when offset money is used to fund projects that would have happened anyways).
Id.
178.
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carbon expenditures. 17 9 Years later, Google has had trouble spending
the credits it acquired initially,1 80 while Yahoo! has given up using
carbon offsets to offset its carbon footprint.1 81 Private businesses help
other companies who want to purchase carbon offsets navigate the
carbon-offset field; however, because this field is largely unregulated,
the reliability of these private companies is unclear.182
Internet companies' unverified claims of neutrality are
troubling because evidence has shown that a company's "green" image
can influence consumer choice.1 83 In a recent study, Professor Michael
Siebecker suggests that "many large U.S. companies consider their
stance on labor, environmental, and social practices to be the 'next
competitive battlefield."' 84 He further argues that unclear corporate
disclosures are problematic "where consumers and investors employ
various social, environmental, or ethical screening criteria before
purchasing a company's stock or products."1 85 Congress, which is
obligated to buy the most efficient equipment reasonably available,
qualifies as a vulnerable consumer in this context. 186 Relying on PUE
might be a "great first step," 187 but for the reasons listed above, it is
insufficient.18 8
Some legal commentators see an additional problem arising
from this type of claim in the green energy market. In her Comment,
Trust and the Green Consumer: The Fight for Accountability in
Renewable Energy Credits, Kelly Crandall notes that in the related

Id.
179.
180.
Cf. Ucilia Wang, Google: Carbon Credit Shopping Ain't Easy, GREENTECH
ENTERPRISE (May 7, 2009), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/google-carbon-creditshopping-aint-easy-4545.
181.
Garthwaite, supra note 101.
182.
See Lisa Roner, US Carbon Offsets: Still Unregulated and Unreliable,
CLIMATECHANGECORP (Sept, 6, 2007), http://www.climatechangecorp.com/content.asp?Content
ID=4909, (discussing some of the problems in the unregulated carbon market); Rubens, supra
note 177 (noting that the carbon market is unregulated).
183.
See Kelly Crandall, Comment, Trust and the Green Consumer: The Fight for
Accountability in Renewable Energy Credits, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 893, 919-20 (2010).
184.
Siebecker, supra note 33, at 127 (quoting Clinton Wilder, The Next Competitive
Battlefield-The Sustainability Movement's 'Triple Bottom Line' Requires IT Execs to Deliver
Better Data, OPTIMIZE, 76 (Aug. 1, 2002)).
185.
Id. at 117.
186.
See Loper & Parr, supra note 30, at 18 ('The federal government is required by law
to purchase energy efficient products unless they are proven to not be cost effective.").
187.
Miller, supranote 114.
188.
See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text (noting that the PUE is not an ideal
comparison of equipment efficiency for several reasons, particularly because it is not verified by a
third party, may not measure overall efficiency, and can be affected by outside factors that are
not always reported).
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field of renewable-energy credits, 189 a market that can be
manipulated, is created by "[g]rowing environmental consciousness
among consumers and weak supervision at the state and federal
Crandall concludes that greater supervision and
levels."19 0
accountability is the only solution to this problem.1 9 1 The Securities
and Exchange Commission has also weighed in on this matter,
recently issuing guidance clarifying that under existing laws,
companies should consider how to appropriately disclose their climate
regulation risks. 192
Finally, without mandatory disclosure, policymakers will not
have enough information to help dictate decisions regarding whether
emissions should be measured at the Scope 1 or Scope 2 levels for the
purposes of climate-change legislation. 193 Additionally, policymakers
may remain locked into some of the regulatory alternatives that are
mentioned above, such as cap-and-trade, without an accurate estimate
of the amount of carbon these companies are emitting.1 94 Further,
lack of consensus about the extent of climate-change damage hinders
regulation. 9 5 Environmentalists often argue that it is better to
regulate to prevent harm before it occurs than to try to remedy
potentially irreparable damage after the fact. 196 This stance is
difficult to defend because many politicians would prefer to avoid
policies that are based on incomplete information, which might offend
powerful economic interests.9 7 Here, policymakers can avoid this type

This Note will analogize renewable energy credits to the use of carbon offsets
189.
because renewable energy credits are another way of commoditizing the environmental benefit of
renewable energy. Crandall, supra note 183, at 895-96. For more information, see id. Like carbon
offsets, renewable energy credits are purchased by consumers and used to satisfy renewable
energy purchasing requirements. Id.
190.
Id. at 957.
191.
Id. at 957-58.
192.
Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Issues Interpretive Guidance on
Disclosure Related to Business or Legal Developments Regarding Climate Change (Jan. 27,
2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-15.htm; see Scott D. Deatherage, The SEC
Enters the Fray on Climate Risk Disclosure,25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 35, 36-38 (2011).
193.
See Loper & Parr, supra note 30, at 15-16 (arguing that policymakers generally
need complete information about the issues they confront in order to make strong policy).
194.
See Joe Romm, Why did Environmentalists Pursue Cap-and-Trade and was it a
Doomed Strategy? CLIMATE PROGRESS (Apr. 21, 2011, 2:15 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/romm/
pursued
that
environmentalists
(arguing
2011/04/21/207932/cap-and-trade-doomed
cap-and-trade as a strategy when the "obvious alternatives" to cap-and-trade, including a carbon
tax, were rejected).
195.
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 1146.
See id. at 1146-47.
196.
See id. at 1146; see also, Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Policy Gridlock on Global
197.
Warming, 79 FOREIGN POL'Y 77, 78 ("Significantly, discussion of the proposals often neglects the
real costs of premature action: the resources denied to other crucial needs and the effects of what
might prove to be costly policy errors."). But see Dana Nuccitelli, Monckton Myth #11: Carbon
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of public scrutiny by mandating disclosure of information measuring
exactly how much Internet companies are contributing to the climate
change problem.
B. Realistic Options for Regulation of Internet Companies
Politicians and policymakers have brought more aggressive
climate-change legislation to Congress before, but lawmakers have not
reached a consensus regarding the content of this legislation. Political
commentators suggest that this gridlock may continue indefinitely.19 8
One reason is that Congress generally views global warming along
party lines: Republicans are more likely to oppose climate-change
legislation, while Democrats are more likely to favor tighter
regulations.1 99 This makes it harder for Congress to enact legislation.
A recent victim of political gridlock was the Waxman-Markey Bill,
legislation that would have codified a cap-and-trade 200 scheme of
regulation but never passed in the Senate. 201 These partisan views
influence the shape of environmental legislation proposals,
contributing to the push and pull between strong policy and
cost-effective, achievable policy. 2 0 2
As discussed above, there are a variety of possible regulatory
"enforcers" that can navigate the disclosure issue created by Internet
companies, including (1) agency action (expanding the EPA reporting
requirements to include Scope 2 emissions), (2) state legislation, and
(3) federal legislation (either in the form of a cap-and-trade or the
creation of a uniform, publicly available carbon-use registry). 203 A
federal and publicly available carbon registry is the strongest solution
because, through the pressures of public accountability, it will
incentivize Internet companies to create and use efficient technology,
Pricing Costs vs. Benefits, SKEPTICAL ScL. (Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.skepticalscience.com/
(arguing that preventing climate
monckton-myth-11-carbon-pricing-costs-vs-benefits.html
change is cheaper than adapting to it when the harm worsens).
198.
Eric Pooley, Why the Climate Bill Failed, TIME June 9, 2008, http://www.time.com/
time/nation/article/0,8599,1812836,00.html.
199.
George Monbiot, Right and Wrong: Why Climate Science Divides People Along
Political Lines, MONBIOT.COM (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2010/08/23/
right-and-wrong.
200.
See generally RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 87; Kate Sheppard, Everything You
Always Wanted to Know About the Waxman-Markey Energy/Climate Bill-in Bullet Points,
GRIST (June 3, 2009), http://www.grist.org/article/2009-06-03-waxman-markey-bill-breakdown.
See supra notes 85- 87 and accompanying text for a definition of a cap-and-trade scheme.
201.
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong., available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hlll-2454 (noting that the bill never became
law because the Senate session expired before it passed and it was cleared from the books).
202.
RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 87, at 3-7.
203.
Id. at 3-7.
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it is cost effective, and it will create uniform measurements for
policymakers and the public to utilize.
1. Agency Action: Potentially Frustrated by Administrative
Requirements under the EPA
Although the EPA could include Scope 2 emissions in its
difficulties, like the
administrative
reporting requirements,
Administrative Procedure Act's requirement for a notice-and-comment
period, might frustrate its efforts. 204 The largest challenge the EPA
will face here is opposition from Internet companies similar to the
challenges from affected companies that the agency recently faced in
promulgating the GHG Reporting Rules. 205 It is reasonable to expect
a similar battle in the notice-and-comment period if the EPA expands
its reporting rules to include indirect emissions. 206 This can lead to
significant delays in legislating climate-change regulation. A federal
carbon registry may take time to enact; however, it would give the
agency the unquestioned authority to act and a clearer timetable for
doing so.
EPA regulation under the CAA may not be a good match
because of the boundary-crossing problems unique to climate-change
legislation. 207 The EPA has the authority to regulate "air pollutants"
that are anticipated to endanger public health. 208 However, it could be
difficult for the EPA to regulate a particular industry based on an
effects test when non-Internet companies that emit carbon and affect
areas outside of US jurisdictions, determine those effects. 209
Additionally, Internet companies could argue that counting Scope 1
emissions serves one of the CAA's goals, which is to prevent adverse
effects on the environment. They could also argue that "double
counting" could exceed statutory authority.
Although the EPA may have the authority to implement a
climate-change registry without additional legislation, it has largely
backed away from a challenge by the companies implicated in the
current reporting requirement. 210 And while the EPA will probably
serve as the agency that regulates a federal carbon bill, it will be more
effective with explicit, federal authority.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
supranotes 71-79 and accompanying text.
supranotes 81-83 and accompanying text.
supranotes 81-83 and accompanying text.
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408, 7411.
supranotes 81-83 and accompanying text.
supranotes 71-79 and accompanying text.
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2. State Legislation: A Fatal Lack of Uniformity
Some states already require accounting of Scope 1 emissions. 2 11
This legislation achieves many of the goals of a federal reporting
requirement; however, such laws generally do not encompass indirect
emissions. 212 Additionally, the varying relationships among state,
federal, and administrative reporting requirements is a "patchwork"
that could lead to duplication of effort. 2 13 State legislation, although
effective at the local level, is unlikely to provide a uniform national
reporting standard because Internet companies are often national
corporations with data centers in multiple states. 214 Because of the
unique boundary-crossing concerns found in climate-change problems,
uniform standards are desirable. 2 15 Further, companies with facilities
in multiple states could take advantage of different state rules by
concentrating their facilities in states with less strict or no reporting
state environmental
in
concern
recurring
requirements-a
216 Because climate change is a problem on a national
legislation.
scale, this approach will not effectively reduce emissions.
3. Federal Legislation
In the past, federal legislation relating to climate change has
focused on either cap-and-trade or a carbon tax.2 1 7 The main criticism
to both a cap-and-trade approach and a carbon tax are the costs to the
individual consumer, both in implementation and in short-term price
inflation "at the pump."218 Of the two, cap-and-trade is the more
A Congressional Research Report on the cost of
expensive. 219
implementing either of these systems notes that a policymaker's

See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
211.
Vandenbergh & Cohen, supra note 92.
212.
Sheehan & Carr, supra note 90.
213.
See COOK & VAN HORN, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that data centers are clustering in
214.
states like North Carolina that have an abundance of cheap energy).
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
215.
See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 698 ("Congress intended that the effluent
216.
limits be uniform throughout the nation for 'similar point sources with similar characteristics,' in
part to prevent geographic competition for industry from undermining water pollution control
standards.").
RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 87, at 3-7; Kenneth R. Meade, Federal Climate
217.
Change: Update and Opportunities, WILMERHALE (July 2008), http://www.wilmerhale.com/
publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=8369 (noting that the main focus is currently on
cap-and-trade).
See LARRY PARKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33799, CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGN
218.
APPROACHES FOR A GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION PROGRAM (2008), http://congressionalresearch.
com/RL33799/document.php.
RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 87, at 4.
219.
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preference for a cap-and-trade system over a carbon tax should reflect
"whether one is more concerned about the possible economic cost of
the program and therefore willing to accept some uncertainty about
the amount of reduction received [carbon taxes]; or one is more
concerned about achieving a specific emissions reduction level with
costs handled efficiently, but not capped [tradable permits]."220 While
cap-and-trade would reduce a specific amount of carbon emissions,
such a program could become very expensive to implement and yet
would not be certain to provide financial returns. Meanwhile, with a
carbon tax, the price of implementation would be low, but the actual
amount of carbon to be reduced would remain uncertain. 22 1 Because a
large portion of the costs of each program are uncertain, the
government can never be sure what kinds of standards to set or how
much expense would be involved. 222
After another climate-change bill, the Lieberman-Warner
Climate Security Act, failed to pass in 2008,223 nme magazine noted
that the "opposition [to climate change] has found a new, well-fortified
position." 224 It argues that politicians who are against climate change
can make a powerful argument that "the U.S. cannot adopt a cap on
carbon emissions . . . because it would drive up energy prices and

wreck the economy." 225 In turn, environmentalists are concerned that
the argument about uncertainty will make legislation too watered
down to effect significant and timely change. 226 Concerns over cost are
exacerbated by the fact that the current poor economic climate has
resulted in a lack of public support for environmental policies. 227
Narrow focus on the two traditional types of climate control can
lead to a congressional stalemate when both types have a difficult
time passing.228 As stated above, some members of Congress have
already rejected one or both of the traditional suggestions for climate
220.

PARKER, supra note 218.

221.

Id.

222.
223.

Id.
Pooley, supra note 198.

224.

Id.

225.

Id.

226.
See Skolnikoff, supra note 197, at 78 ("Indeed, no major action is likely to be taken
until those uncertainties are substantially reduced, and probably not before evidence of warming
and its effects are actually visible.").
Pooley, supra note 198 (describing how political opponents of comprehensive
227.
climate-change bills have used the threat of rising costs of gasoline in a bad economy to block
climate-change legislation).
228.
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 158 ("As the Obama administration presses
Congress to adopt a national program to control emissions of greenhouse gases, the question of
whether a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade approach should be used is being debated."); see also
RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 87, at 5-7 (recognizing a possible balance between the carbon tax
and cap-and-trade approaches).

456

VANDERBILT J OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 14:2:425

change. 229 Thus, when alternative measures are included in bills that
support these traditional approaches, the bills are likely to fail
because of the political gridlock: For example, in the failed
Waxman-Markey Bill, the EPA would have been directed to create a
"Greenhouse Gas Registry." 230 That bill also included cap-and-trade,
which has had a difficult time passing. Since Waxman-Markey's
failure, there has not been a suggestion of a national carbon registry
beyond the large-scale emitters included in the reporting
requirement. 23 1
This dualistic analysis is problematic for another reason: It
A
often leads to gridlock and polarization along party lines.
Republican Party memo outlining a strategy for discounting
cap-and-trade based on any incremental increase in the price of
gasoline is a perfect example. 232 The memo stated: "[t]he goal is for a
theme (example: climate bill equals higher gas prices) each day, and
the focus is much more on making political points than in amending
the bill . . . or affecting policy." 2 3 3 Each of these schemes has a poorer
chance of becoming law when it cannot sidestep a price increase, 234 the
country is in a recession, 235 and the partisan politics that has delayed
climate change in the past does not appear to be dissipating. 236
III. SOLUTION: AN IMMEDIATE FEDERAL UNIFORM REPORTING
REQUIREMENT THAT ENCOMPASSES SCOPE 2 EMISSIONS
Although a reporting requirement alone would not achieve the
emissions reduction that a cap-and-trade or a carbon tax could, 237 a
federal registry would affect measureable change at a lower cost than
either of these schemes. A federal reporting requirement, enacted
outside of the CAA, is far less costly than either cap-and-trade or a
See Romm, supra note 194.
229.
230.
See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 311,
available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h11l-2454&tab=summary (directing
the EPA to issue regulations resulting in a federal GHG registry).
231.
See supra Part L.A.2 (discussing the requirements of the Greenhouse Gas Reporting
Program, at 40 C.F.R. §98 (2006)).
232.
Pooley, supra note 198.
233.
Id. (quoting the GOP strategy memo which had been made available by Democratic
leader Harry Reid).
234.
Id.
235.
Matthew E. Kahn & Matthew J. Kotchen, Environmental Concern and the Business
Cycle: The Chilling Effect of Recession 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16241, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl6241.pdf.
236.
See supra notes 217-235 and accompanying text.
237.
See generally RAMSEUR & PARKER, supra note 87, at 1 (suggesting that
cap-and-trade controls emissions more effectively than the other listed market-based,
climate-change option, a carbon tax).
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carbon tax, while a uniform standard avoids the problems raised by
state legislation and agency regulation. 238 Additionally, this federal
legislation will avoid the CAA structure. 239 Although the EPA will
probably implement this new legislation, explicit authority from
federal legislation will help the EPA avoid a drawn out
notice-and-comment period. 240 Finally, this requirement is likely to
have an environmentally friendly effect on consumer choice,
incentivize industry to create better technology, and allow
policymakers to help make more informed decisions in the future.
A. Effect of a Reporting Requirement on Consumer Choice
This relatively inexpensive change 2 41 can be powerful because
of the effect that more information will have on consumer choice. At
the individual level, carbon can be reduced both through personal
changes in electricity consumption 242 and in the influence that a better
environmental policy will have on consumers who might choose to
purchase Internet services from companies that use cleaner energy. 243
Data suggests that when people have access to information
about which companies expend the most energy, they will alter their
habits to use more efficient energy. 244 This is because environmental
issues are generally important to Americans, 245 and a company with
better technology is more efficient. 246 Such a company will save more
money when energy regulations are enacted, which some think is
inevitable. 247 A meaningful comparison will give credit where it is due
See Guide to Understanding Factors that Affect Verification Costs, CLIMATE
238.
REGISTRY, 3-8 (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.theclimateregistry.org/downloads/2011/02/2011-02-10TCR-Guidance-on-Verification-Cost-Factors.pdf (last updated Feb. 10, 2011).
239.
See Peters, supranote 85.
Cf. United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (noting
240.
that the EPA's response to notice and comments was inadequate because "agencies do not have
quite the prerogative of obscurantism reserved to legislatures").
241.
Compare Guide to UnderstandingFactors that Affect Verification Costs, supra note
238 (noting the relatively low cost of reporting verification), with Pooley, supra note 198 (noting
that additional costs in electricity and gasoline are inevitable in the face of more traditional
climate-change options like cap-and-trade).
242.
See supranote 148.
243.
See Siebecker, supranote 33, at 123-24.
244.
See, e.g., Dietz et al., supra note 34, at 18452-54 (noting the results of a study
indicating the significant effect consumer behavior patterns can have on energy consumption).
245.
Kahn & Kotchen, supra note 235, at 18.
See Polastre, supra note 168 (suggesting that it is cheaper to have less
246.
energy-intensive equipment, both in anticipation of imminent regulations and for the electricity
bill); see also Andrew Nusca, HP Opens First Wind-Cooled Green Data Center; Most Efficient to
Date, SMARTPLANET (Feb. 11, 2010, 9:16 AM), http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/smart-takes/hpopen-first-wind-cooled-green-data-center-most-efficient-to-date/4191.
247.
See Pooley, supra note 198 (discussing whether climate change is inevitable).
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and allow companies to compete for better energy equipment.
Internet company competitors should admire and later emulate
innovative strategies. Google appears to be leading the pack in its
"green effort"2 4 8 and if it is, it should receive that praise and any
Ultimately, public accountability will help
competitive benefit.
policymakers develop a strategy to account for companies that have a
small amount of direct emissions but a disproportionately large
amount of indirect emissions. 249
Further, more information can help consumers alter their
usage and thus reduce emissions. A study on the effect of public
accountability showed that when consumers had a meter attached to
their heaters, they reduced their heat usage. 250 It appears that a large
portion of consumers were able to alter their behavior when they had
access to clear information about their energy usage. 25 1 With accurate
and complete information from Internet companies, private or public
third parties such as Greenpeace can publish information relating to
individual usage. 252 These small changes made with a thermostat had
a strong effect in the aggregate. 253
B. Information For Policymakers
Currently, a policymaker interested in regulating carbon
a
an industry that consumes
emissions lacks data for
254
world's
energy.
Having
the
disproportionately large amount of the
PUE of most Internet companies is not enough because it does not
reflect the overall amount of emissions for each company. 255 As
mentioned above, some companies use multiple servers to produce a
faster search result,2 5 6 so more efficient equipment is not necessarily
indicative of the total amount of carbon each company emits. Further,
Internet companies calculate their PUE without third-party

248.
COOK & VAN HORN, supra note 2. Although Google received a few low scores for its
climate policy, Google received a relatively high score of "B" for its mitigation policy. Id.
249.
See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the benefits of considering the emissions
attributed to the Internet companies even though they are indirect).
250.
Dietz et al., supra note 34, at 18454-55 (noting the potential for emissions reduction
if behavior is altered at the individual level).
251.
Id. at 18454 (acknowledging that financial incentives play a significant role in
causing behavior modification but in coming years, this change could result from the efforts of
grassroots-political organizations working toward combating climate change).
252.
See COOK & VAN HORN, supra note 2.
253.
Dietz et al., supra note 34, at 18452-54.
254.
See Vandenbergh & Cohen, supra note 92, at 250.
255.
See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
256.
See Miller, supra note 172; Polastre, supra note 168.
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verification. 2 5 7 This is a significant amount of data unavailable to a
policymaker attempting to define a technology-based, economy-based,
or emissions-based standard. 258
IV. CONCLUSION

Internet companies have too large a carbon footprint to remain
unregulated. 259 The law should require these companies to have
publicly available accounting, which shows where they are spending
their energy. 260 The fact that these companies do not emit carbon
directly into the atmosphere does not make them any less
responsible.261

An information-based requirement is less expensive than a
more aggressive regulatory scheme and can make each of these
schemes more effective by including Scope 2 emissions. 262 Also, the
immediate success of either a cap-and-trade or carbon tax scheme
seems unlikely. If past experience repeats itself, both regulatory
schemes will struggle more in the face of a poor economic climate. 263
Public reporting will help future regulation by providing more
reliable data, which is one of the biggest criticisms facing
cap-and-trade. 264 Requiring public reporting so that the enacting
agency and third parties can check the data 265 will enable
policymakers to make better decisions regarding indirect emissions
regulation. 266 This could cut down on the cost of more aggressive
regulation in the future. 267 An EPA reporting requirement for indirect
energy emissions that surpasses a statutorily defined threshold is an
effective and economically sound measure.
A uniform federal standard should remove some of the
competitive concerns companies have raised in opposition to proposed
reporting requirements. Without more information, companies should

257.
See supraPart I.C.
258.
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 15, at 638. (technological standard); Loper & Parr,
supra note 30, at 15-16 (economic and emissions standard).
259.
See Dubash, supra note 21.
Id.
260.
261.
See, e.g., Yahoo! Information Request, supra note 25.
262.
See supranote 241 and accompanying text.
263.
See Kahn & Kutchen, supra note 235, at 16 (noting a decrease in public interest in
environmental policies during economic downturns); see also supra Part II.B.3.
264.
PARKER, supra note 218.
265.
See Cappiello, supra note 152.
266.
Loper & Parr, supra note 30, at 15-16.
267.
With better information, policymakers may be able to enact regulation like the
suggested registry, and avoid the stalemate produced by more aggressive regulation, such as a
carbon tax or cap-and-trade. See supra notes 228-231 and accompanying text.
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not be able to claim that disclosure harms competition, both because it
is not clear why their innovations would be revealed to their
competitors through emissions accounting and because Google's recent
high profile disclosure undercuts this assertion altogether. 268 Finally,
it is unfair for these companies to self-regulate but still make claims
as to their relative neutrality 269 when this might be giving them an
unfair advantage in the marketplace. 27 0
If it is true that stricter energy regulations are "inevitable,"2 7 1
then Internet companies should welcome a uniform accounting of their
energy needs. A cost-benefit analysis will be at the heart of any
energy policy, 27 2 and while current cap-and-trade probably would not
affect indirect emissions, a stringent carbon tax could be difficult for
Internet companies. 273
Federal legislation resulting in a public carbon registry
depicting Internet companies' total emissions will aid policymakers in
targeting the main sources of indirect emissions. Internet companies
should not be allowed to act "green" and simultaneously refuse to
disclose their total emissions.
Internet companies provide an
important service and are more environmentally friendly than other
mass communication options like faxing and printing. 274 Although it
is important to protect their competitive trade secrets, it appears that
Internet companies have overstated their need for secrecy on this
point. Public accountability will allow policymakers to craft the best
standard from a cost-benefit point of view. More information will lead
to more effective policy for both the environment and the industry.
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